Municipalities Can’t Escape Liability for Condominium Fees

 by Thomas Moriarty and Richard Brooks

 

A recent Massachusetts court decision has given condominium associations a new legal tool – or at least, sharpened an existing tool – for dealing with disputes over liability for unpaid condominium fees.

Interpreting Mass. General Laws Chapter 60 Section 77 (governing municipal tax takings) for the first time in a condominium context, the Supreme Judicial Court held in Town of Milford v. James S. Boyd that the town had benefited from the community association’s “continued care and maintenance” of the common areas, and thus should pay its proportionate share of the common area expenses.   While the foreclosure proceeding erased the condominium association’s lien, the court agreed, that action did not negate the town’s liability for the unpaid condominium fees incurred from the date of the taking until the foreclosure judgment was entered.

  The case began when the town of Milford initiated tax title proceedings against 11 commercial condominium units owned by Caruso Builders, the developer of the complex.  The recession of the late 1980s had left the units seriously underwater from all directions, worth considerably less than the outstanding mortgage or the unpaid taxes.  With resale prospects limited, to say the least, neither the town nor the banks holding the mortgages were much inclined to foreclose.  So the units remained in limbo for almost two years, with condominium fees continuing to mount all the while.  Finally, in an effort to stop the bleeding, the condominium association moved to foreclose, claiming that it had a priority lien on the units (a contention the association ultimately dropped) and that the town was liable for the more than $200,000 in accrued condominium fees – the central issue that the court decided in the association’s favor. 

 

It Means What it Says

The legal arguments focused on the wording of the state statute governing municipal tax takings, the key provision of which specifies: 

“Before foreclosure, so much of the provisions of any covenant or agreement running with the land as calls for the payment of money by the owner thereof shall not be enforceable against a town which is the owner of record of such land under a tax title taking, except as hereinafter provided.”  After some intervening language, this section continues:  “In no event, however, shall such provisions calling for the payment of money be so suspended and inoperative during any period in which such town directly or indirectly in any capacity accepts or receives the benefit of such covenant or agreement or of any right or privilege created or affected thereby.” 

 

Milford argued that only the language barring enforcement of payment obligations against a municipality applied. The exception language, the town contended, was unrelated to this central rule.

The Land Court rejected that argument, concluding that the statute was clear and that its plain language meant what it said.  The foreclosure extinguished the condominium’s lien for unpaid common expenses (permitting the sale of the units), the court said, but it did not erase the town’s liability for unpaid common expenses accrued before the foreclosure decree.  The SJC had no trouble affirming that opinion.  “To conclude that the last sentence does not provide an exception to the first sentence would render the modifying clause nugatory,” the state high court asserted in a unanimous opinion.

Say It Ain’t So

In its appeal, the town had emphasized a second argument, challenging the Land Court’s finding that the town had, in fact, benefited from the upkeep of the condominium common areas after taking tax title to the condominium units.  Under the Land Court’s interpretation of the statute, the town noted, municipalities would always benefit from common area maintenance and thus would automatically become liable for condominium fees for at least six months (the required wait before filing a foreclosure petition) whenever they initiated tax title proceedings against a condominium unit.

The SJC did not find that prospect nearly as troubling as the town suggested it should be.  “The town may have accurately predicted the consequences of the Land Court’s interpretation,” the SJC agreed.  “But we see nothing incongruous about those consequences.  Rather, they are consistent with the statutory language and overall statutory scheme….Although it may be difficult to imagine a situation in which the payment of a common area charge would not benefit a town,” the court added, “we do not foreclose such a possibility.” 

Undisputed Benefit

The key issue, the court emphasized, is the benefit the town derives from the maintenance of the common areas – a benefit that, the court concluded, is impossible to deny.  “Common areas of a condominium unit are inextricably connected to the condominium units themselves,” the decision notes.  “The units literally could not exist without them.” 

  Common area expenses were particularly important in this development, the court added, because the 11 units at issue represented more than 38 percent of the condominium “and therefore 38 percent of the condominium expense budget.” Eliminating the town’s obligation to pay those condominium fees, the court said, would threaten the financial viability of the condominium as a whole.   

The decision noted similarities between this case and previous tax title cases, in which the SJC had found communities liable for injuries incurred before the foreclosure proceedings.  “…[I]n the present case, the town could not permit the units and their corresponding share in the common areas to fall into a state of disrepair or dilapidation,” the court observed.  “It would have had to incur expenses for the ongoing maintenance of that property.” Given that the town clearly benefited from the community association’s efforts to maintain the property, the court concluded, “the Land Court’s construction of the statute requiring the town to pay its proportionate share is eminently logical and reasonable.” 

Incentive to Act

As a practical matter, this decision probably won’t change current condominium association practices.  Even with the current economic downturn, property values remain strong and it is difficult to anticipate a foreclosure situation in which units would lack sufficient value to pay off all outstanding liens.  Certainly in a residential context, it is unlikely that an owner who has stopped paying property taxes would continue paying condominium fees for long enough to accumulate a large tax deficiency before someone – the town, the lender, or the association – acts. 

However, we are entering a period that will almost certainly see a period of slower growth in property values than we have seen in recent years, and could see some depreciation.  Given a steep and prolonged downturn, this case should give community associations a measure of added comfort.  It also should underscore the need for local officials to move quickly in a tax title situation to limit the liability that the courts have made it clear, municipalities will not be able to deny. 


LEGAL BRIEFS

Forced Access Appeal. The “forced access” battle isn’t over yet.  The Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE) and the Smart Buildings Project are appealing a Superior Court decision overturning DTE rules requiring property owners to give all telecommunications companies access to office buildings and multifamily dwellings.
The DTE and the telecom providers, represented by the Smart Buildings Policy Project, argued that the state had a legitimate interest in providing “open” access to ensure that tenants received the lower costs and breadth of services that competition among varied telecom companies would bring.  The real estate interests argued that the unrestricted access the DTE rules represented an unconstitutional taking of private property without compensation.  The court sided unequivocally with the property owners in this closely watched litigation.  The challenged regulations will remain unenforceable pending the appeal.
Piercing the Veil.  Corporate shareholders and officers can be held personally liable for violations of the Federal Housing Act, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit ruled recently.  The decision came in a suit filed by an interracial couple against a real estate broker who had refused to convey their purchase offer to a homebuilder.  The couple and the builder filed separate suits against the agent and against David Meyer, an officer of Triad, Inc., the California realty firm with which the broker was affiliated.  The district court dismissed the liability claim against Meyer, agreeing that corporate officers generally are immune from liability for corporate acts. 

 

But the appeals court overturned, noting that the Federal Housing Act specifically assigns liability to “those who direct or control or have the right to direct or control the conduct of another with respect to the…sale of a dwelling.”  Meyer and the National Association of Realtors have asked for a rehearing by the entire court.  If the ruling stands, it would apply only in the 9th Circuit, which encompasses Alaska, Hawaii, and many states in the west.  But other federal courts could use the decision as a precedent in similar fair housing complaints.  “We think the ruling is a mistake,” Laurie Janik, general counsel for the NAR, said in press reports.  “The liability should stop with the corporation.  The ruling is an aberration,” she added, and “it is very frightening.”
State Superlien Overrides Bankruptcy Stay.  A bankruptcy filing may stay other actions, but it did not stay a move by Massachusetts officials to impose a “superlien” on contaminated property.  That ruling, by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, came in a suit involving Main Street Ltd. Partnership, owner of a property from which pollutants had contaminated nearby drinking water wells, requiring the state to initiate emergency clean-up efforts.  When the state notified the group of its intent to file a superlien on the property to recover the cleanup costs, the partnership filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition with a notice of automatic stay.  The partnership asked the bankruptcy court to hold the state in contempt for trying to enforce the superlien over the stay, but the bankruptcy court refused and the partnership appealed.  The district court sided with the state and the appeals court upheld that decision, finding that the exemptions from the automatic stay applied not just to actions to perfect a lien, but also to actions to perfect “an interest in property.”  The partnership argued that the state’s interest consisted of the lien, which was filed after the bankruptcy petition.  But the court concluded that the state’s interest was broader than the lien and not synonymous with it. 
Open Records.  As Congress moves to add tougher money laundering laws to the anti-terrorism arsenal, financial institutions are growing increasingly concerned about potential conflicts between their obligation to cooperate with law enforcement officials, and their obligation to protect consumer privacy.  A recent court decision, although unrelated to the terrorist attack, suggests clearly that the tide has shifted away from privacy and toward enforcement.  The decision, by the Kansas Supreme Court, held that the state’s securities commissioner had the authority to prohibit Bank of America from notifying a consumer when the bank received a subpoena for that consumer’s financial records, even though the bank’s privacy policy specifically required notification.

The state’s high court upheld a lower court’s finding that the bank’s customers had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records.  Two justices dissented, arguing that the majority view failed to recognize adequately the legitimate privacy interests of bank customers.  “Although I concede a bank customer in Kansas has no constitutional expectation of privacy in his or her bank records,” Kansas Court of Appeals Judge David Knudson wrote in his dissent, “most customers surely believe that their banker will notify them if some government agency is snooping around in their records and accounts.  I do not believe the legislature intended to negate that entirely rational and understandable expectation by the banking public,” he added. 


For further information about this case or about real estate issues generally, contact  via e-mail at mailto:@meeb.com or call 781-843-5000.

 


For further information about these issues or real estate in general, contact Thomas Moriarty (tmoriarty@meeb.com) or Richard Brooks (rbrooks@meeb.com) or call 781-843-5000.